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NOTE
FDIC Priority in Gaff: An Unwarranted Victory for the
Principle of Brotherly Shove.
When banks went out of business during the Depression, lines formed.
More than sixty years later, as American society reacquaints itself with
the term "bank failure," lines are forming once again.
This time, however, the lines do not consist of scared depositors
of little means waiting outside the bank's front door for a chance to
withdraw their money. Today's lines consist of creditors and big-money
customers who are standing in line at the courthouse door for a chance
to sue the people who ran the bank.
The chief plaintiff in these lines is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC is best known to the banking public
as the federal agency that insures deposits up to $100,000.' But with
the litany of failures that have plagued United States financial institutions
in recent years, another FDIC duty has become increasingly noticed-
that of receiver of the broke bank.2
In recent cases, the FDIC, as receiver, has put a new coat of paint
on an old argument-that when plaintiffs line up against the failed
bank's management, the FDIC should be free to push its way to the
head of the line. The Agency has contended that courts should place
FDIC claims against a bank's officers and directors ahead of those filed
by all other parties-even claims brought solely on behalf of the share-
holders and depositors as individuals. Most federal courts have refused
to grant such a priority. The Sixth Circuit, however, recently broke with
this approach and sided with the FDIC, creating a split in the federal
appellate courts.
This note will explore the ramifications of this split. Section A will
explain the broad powers already available to the FDIC as receiver of
. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(l)(B) (1988).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988) provides that "[tihe Corporation [FDIC] shall
be appointed receiver, and shall accept such appointment, whenever a receiver is appointed
for the purpose of liquidation or winding up the affairs of an insured Federal depository
institution or District bank by the appropriate Federal banking agency. .. ."
When the FDIC acts as a receiver, its function is similar to that of a receiver
appointed to take over a failing business corporation. A "receiver" has been adequately
defined as a custodian of assets that are involved in litigation, who is the managing agent
of property for the benefit of parties. Black's Law Dictionary 1268 (West 6th ed. 1990).
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a failed bank, and the basis for the FDIC's contention that those powers
require depositors and shareholders to stand aside. Section B will discuss
the legal basis for the FDIC's argument that its claims are entitled to
priority. Sections C through F will explain the less-than-convincing way
in which the Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish conflicting jurispru-
dence and how it ignored congressional intent and previous jurisprudence
in recognizing an FDIC priority. Finally, Section G will argue that the
Sixth Circuit's recognition of an FDIC priority goes beyond the Agency's
congressionally created powers and that the court's reasoning is an
aberration that future courts should be reluctant to follow.
A. FDIC as Receiver: "We're From the Government, and We're
Here to Help"
There are three situations in which the FDIC may become the receiver
of a troubled bank. First, if the FDIC liquidates a federally insured
national bank, federal law requires that the appropriate federal banking
agency appoint the FDIC as receiver.' Second, the FDIC may accept
an appointment as receiver of a federally insured state bank when the
supervising state agency makes the appointment.4 Third, the FDIC may
appoint itself as receiver,5 although the requirements for this are more
complex. To appoint itself, the FDIC must determine that a receiver
already has been appointed, that the bank has been in receivership for
at least fifteen consecutive days, and that one or more depositors is
unable .to withdraw any amount of an insured deposit or that state
officials have closed the bank pursuant to state law. 6 The FDIC also
must conclude that one or more of eight reasons for appointment existed
when the proper authority appointed the receiver or closed the bank,
or that any of the eight reasons existed any time during the receiver's
appointment or while the bank was closed.
The reasons most likely to apply to failed banks are: the bank has
more liabilities than assets (balance-sheet insolvency), the bank likely
will be unable to meet its depositors' demands or pay its obligations in
the normal course of business (cash-flow insolvency), or the bank has
incurred, or is likely to incur, losses that will deplete all, or substantially
all, of its capital, with no reasonable prospect for replenishment with
federal assistance. 7
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3)(A) (1988). The basic difference between a state bank and
a national bank is that a state bank receives its charter according to applicable state law,
while a national bank is chartered under the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216
(1988)).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4) (1988).
6. Id.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) (1988).
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Once the FDIC becomes a receiver, it has several options. It can
take ovei the bank and operate it with all powers of a private operator
until a buyer is found.' It can merge the bank into another institution.9
It can liquidate the bank and put it out of business.'0 Generally, the
Agency as receiver has the power to take any action that is necessary
to return the bank to a sound and solvent condition." When the FDIC
acts as receiver, it is not subject to the direction or supervision of any
other government agency, state or federal, except an appropriate federal
banking agency.' 2
In addition to this pervasive power, there are two more important
sources of FDIC authority that lie at the heart of the present split in
the federal appellate courts. Once the FDIC pays a depositor in con-
nection with any bank it insures or assumes any of the bank's deposits,
the Agency becomes subrogated to all rights of the depositor against
the bank to the extent of the payment or assumption. 3 The FDIC also
succeeds to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of the bank "and of
any stockholder, member, accountholder, depositor, officer or direc-
t o r . . . .. , 14
B. FDIC's Role for Other Plaintiffs: "Get Thee Behind Me"
The FDIC has used these provisions to fashion an argument that
is appealing in its simplicity: If the FDIC is subrogated to all rights of
the depositor and succeeds to all rights of any shareholder against the
bank, any claim a shareholder or depositor has against the bank's
management must stand behind the FDIC's similar claims. The FDIC
has argued that the policy of the statute-to ensure a strong national
banking system-strongly supports a general priority in favor of the
FDIC on all personal claims against the failed bank's management. In
its simplest terms, the FDIC believes that all plaintiffs must stand aside
until the FDIC refills its cash drawer.
This issue is of vital importance to shareholders and big-money
depositors of failed banks. When a bank goes under, there is little
chance that the bank's assets will fully compensate these parties. As a
result, aggrieved investors and depositors logically target the bank's
officers and directors. This is especially true where there is a connection
between the bank's failure and instances of fraud, mismanagement, or
breach of fiduciary duty by officers and directors.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B) (1988).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G) (1988).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(E) (1988).
i. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D) (1988).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(C)-(D) (1988).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g)(1) (1988).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
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In the recent parade of financial institution failures, federal regu-
lators found pervasive internal mismanagement and self-dealing. A 1989
United States government General Accounting Office (GAO) study of
bank and savings and loan failures found that fraud and insider abuse
existed in every instance of savings and loan failure." A similar GAO
study of banks revealed that sixty-four percent of failed banks experi-
enced instances of insider abuse. 16 Actual insider fraud was present in
thirty-eight percent of the failed banks.' 7 Most pointed was this GAO
conclusion: The thing that most often separated financial institutions
that failed from those that were healthy was that healthy institutions
lacked significant insider abuse and fraud. 8
Against this background of rampant fraud and insider abuse in
failed banks, it is hardly surprising that angry investors and depositors
take aim at the failed bank's management. But if the FDIC is correct
in asserting that all claims, even those brought on behalf of the depositors
and shareholders as individuals, must yield to the FDIC, the consequences
are serious for aggrieved investors. Unless the officers and directors are
extremely wealthy, and unless they have assets that litigants easily can
reach, after the FDIC is finished, the investors and depositors may find
nothing left but the bleached bones of a financial skeleton. This is so
because the causes of action investors often invoke against the bank's
managers are the same ones the FDIC uses-negligence, breach of fi-
duciary duty, breach of contract (express or implied), common-law fraud
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' 9
RICO is an especially tempting action for any plaintiff who pursues a
fraud-based action against bank officers and directors because a suc-
cessful claim can bring treble damages and attorney's fees. 20
C. Gaff v. FDIC: Where the Trouble Begins
Most recently, the FDIC's claim of priority reached the appellate
court level in Gaff v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.21 In Gaff, the
FDIC took over National Bank & Trust Co. of Traverse City, Michigan
when the bank went insolvent. The FDIC, as receiver, sold the bank's
15. Examination and Supervision of Depository Institutions: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 13, 1989),
noted in Renae V. Stevens, Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial
Institutions: A Crisis?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 222, 227 (1989).
16. Id. at 228.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Carol Galbraith & Joseph Seidel, FDIC vs. Imprudent Banking Officials: The
Enforcement Apparatus, 104 Banking L.J. 92, 122 (1987).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984).
21. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
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questionable and non-performing assets to itself (the FDIC) in its cor-
porate capacity. These assets included the right to sue the bank's former
officers and directors for fraud and mismanagement.
However, the FDIC was not the first plaintiff to sue the officers
and directors. Before the bank went under, a bank stockholder filed
suit against the former officers and directors, asserting state law deriv-
ative and direct actions. 22 Once the FDIC took over the bank as receiver,
it intervened in the stockholder's suit and removed the case to federal
court. A federal district judge then stopped the plaintiff-shareholder
from proceeding in his derivative action until the court resolved the
FDIC's claims.
The FDIC went further. It argued that the court also should prevent
the plaintiff from prosecuting claims he asserted on behalf of himself.
and other shareholders, until the court disposed of the FDIC's own
actions against the officers and directors. The court sided with the FDIC,
holding that the agency's claims must have priority over those of share-
holders or depositors. The court reasoned that under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g),
when the FDIC sues officers and directors, it sues not only on behalf
of a bank; it also sues on behalf of the bank's depositors. This status,
the court said, creates a priority. The court said that it is undisputed
that a bank's depositors have rights that are superior to those of the
bank's stockholders. Because the FDIC succeeds to the depositors' rights,
the court said, the FDIC is entitled to this same priority.23
The court also noted that if the officers and directors had any
money left over after the FDIC collected, the plaintiff-shareholder could
proceed with his action. The court analogized the FDIC's priority to
principles of the Federal Bankruptcy Code,24 which puts corporate share-
holders last in line behind other creditors. "5
22. The plaintiff brought the derivative actions on behalf of the bank corporation.
He filed the direct suit as a class action on behalf of himself and other stockholders.
Id. at 386.
There is, of course, a basic difference between derivative and direct actions. A
shareholder files a derivative action to collect damages on behalf of the corporation in
which he owns stock. A shareholder who files a direct action seeks to collect damages
for injuries personally suffered. The corporation collects any damages won in a derivative
action, while it is not entitled to any part of a shareholder's recovery on a direct claim.
23. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 394.
24. The court specifically referred to 1i U.S.C. § 510(b), which says, in relevant
part:
[A] claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the
debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase
or sale of such a security ... shall be subordinated to all claims or interests
that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security,
except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority
19921
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The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Gaff, however, is at odds with the
Eleventh Circuit's analysis. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jen-
kins,2 6 the court held that the FDIC has no such priority over the
individual claims of the bank's shareholders.
The facts of Jenkins are similar to Gaff. In Jenkins, the Florida
Department of Banking and Finance declared a state-chartered bank
insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. As in Gaff, the FDIC,
as receiver, sold certain assets to itself in its corporate capacity. After
the insolvency, several bank shareholders filed lawsuits based on Florida
securities law, common-law fraud, civil conspiracy, negligence, civil theft,
and RICO against the bank's officers and directors.
The FDIC then brought an action against the shareholders, seeking
a declaratory judgment that all shareholder claims, except those based
on federal and state securities law, were derivative actions and thus the
FDIC's property. The FDIC also sought a declaratory judgment that
its actions against the officers and directors should have priority over
the shareholders' similar claims.
The FDIC argued that in a purchase and assumption transaction
(where the FDIC arranges a sale of the insolvent bank's assets to a
solvent bank), the FDIC needs an absolute priority in suits against third
parties. This priority, the FDIC contended, would assist the Agency in
replacing money paid out of the permanent insurance fund. The court
agreed that ensuring the integrity of the permanent insurance fund is
important to achieving the goal of a sound national banking system.
However, the court declined to grant the FDIC an absolute priority for
a very simple reason-the FDIC's authorizing legislation does not provide
for it. 27
as common stock.
Gaff, 919 F.2d at 394.
25. The court observed: "Because this case must be decided under federal law, this
national policy of priorities imported from bankruptcy law will be pursued, not state law
policies that might be to the contrary." Gaff, 919 F.2d at 394.
It should be noted that the FDIC and the bank's shareholders eventually settled their
dispute. In an effort to assist this settlement, the Sixth Circuit modified its original opinion
to include this additional rule: Where a settlement would be assisted by prior adjudication
of the legal sufficiency of shareholder claims, the district court may lift the stay on
prosecution of shareholder claims and determine their sufficiency. However, this modi-
fication did nothing to alter the Sixth Circuit's previous recognition of a priority for the
FDIC and the stay on shareholder claims that it says must occur when the FDIC sues
the bank's officers and directors. See Gaff v. FDIC, 933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1991).
26. 888 F.2d 1537 (lth Cir. 1989).
27. The court said:
While we do not necessarily disagree with the policy considerations advanced
by the district court, we note that as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act indicates
no such priority, a decision to give the FDIC such a priority is more properly
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The court also declined an FDIC request to recognize a common-
law priority for the FDIC as a general creditor. As in Gaff, the court
considered an analogy to federal bankruptcy law, which subordinates
the claims of stockholders to those of general creditors. The court found
this analogy unconvincing because the shareholders in Jenkins were trying
to collect against solvent third parties in a non-derivative suit, unlike a
creditor in bankruptcy, which proceeds against the bankrupt party (in
this case, the failed bank). The Jenkins court's analysis recognizes a
vital distinction-the difference between a shareholder who files a de-
rivative claim and one who files a direct claim against the officers and
directors of the bankrupt corporation for injuries personal to the share-
holder.
There is little argument that a corporation's general creditors should
stand ahead of the stockholder who is trying to recover corporate assets.
The shareholder's role is that of risk-taker. He provides capital. In
exchange, he anticipates a larger return on his investment than someone
who merely lends money to the corporation. The general creditor, who
has a limited return on his investment, expects greater security and a
priority claim on corporate assets. This arrangement ultimately works
to the shareholder's advantage, since it lowers the cost of borrowing
money and thus increases the corporation's chances of making a profit.
This justification for general creditor priority vanishes when the
lawsuit is a personal action against the corporation's officers and di-
rectors. The lack of priority is a natural result of the separate nature
of the corporation and the individuals who run it. Creditors have long
recognized this. It is for this reason that creditors of closely-held cor-
porations usually require that officers and directors sign personal guar-
anties before the creditors will lend money to the corporation.
As a result, the FDIC's analogy to bankruptcy law does not with-
stand logical scrutiny. Without a personal guaranty, a bankrupt cor-
poration's general creditors have no priority over the shareholders on
a claim against the corporation's officers and directors that alleges
injuries personal to the shareholder. The general creditor's priority should
apply only where corporate assets are involved-when, for instance, suit
is filed on behalf of the corporation against the officers and directors.
When a bank's depositors and shareholders sue the officers and directors
in their individual capacity to collect for injuries that are personal to
the depositors and shareholders, they are not seeking assets of the failed
bank.
within the domain of Congress. We decline the FDIC's invitation to act on
arguments based on equity or on "implicit" powers.
Id. at 1541 n.6.
19921
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D. Reconciling Gaff and Jenkins: A Distinction Without a
Difference
The Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit obviously have taken
different approaches to the question of FDIC priority. Since Jenkins
was the first case on this subject, the Sixth Circuit was forced to reconcile
its holding with the Eleventh Circuit's approach. The Sixth Circuit found
that Jenkins was not controlling for two reasons. The stockholders in
Jenkins asserted causes of action granted by statute, namely state and
federal securities laws. The court found the Jenkins opinion unclear on
whether the stockholders claimed fraud-based injuries that were distinctly
theirs or injuries which affected the corporation generally. The court
also found Jenkins not controlling because the failed bank in Jenkins
was a state-chartered bank, which the court said may involve different
policy reasons for applying federal law.
These distinctions, however, are unconvincing. There is little reason
for the Sixth Circuit to question whether the Jenkins shareholders' causes
of action were particular to themselves or whether they belonged to the
corporation generally. The Eleventh Circuit specifically found that the
Jenkins shareholders were "proceeding against solvent third-parties in
non-derivative shareholder suits."2 The term "non-derivative" indicates
that the shareholders' causes of action had nothing to do with injuries
to the corporation. The shareholders were attempting to collect for
injuries to themselves. With little basis for doing so, the Sixth Circuit
seems to question the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Florida law.
This seems inappropriate, since Florida sits within the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit frequently decides questions of Florida law in
federal diversity cases, and it is far more competent to determine whether
the shareholder claims were derivative.
In addition, the Sixth Circuit's attempt to distinguish Jenkins because
it involved a state bank is unconvincing under the FDIC's own statement
of the law's policy-maintaining the integrity of the national bank
system. This interest is no less strong when the FDIC takes over a failed
state bank. The health of the nation's financial system depends on a
functioning network of banks, both state and federal, engaged in the
free circulation of capital. As a result, a failed state bank is just as
damaging to the system as a failed national bank.
The Sixth Circuit implicitly recognized that its holding in Gaff was
inconsistent with Jenkins. It concluded that the Eleventh Circuit may
have weighed too lightly the policies behind the application of federal
law to the FDIC. The Sixth Circuit took issue with the Eleventh Circuit's
statement that it would "not approve of judicial expansion of the express
28. Id. at 1545 (emphasis added).
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powers and rights granted to the FDIC . . . by Congress." 29 The Sixth
Circuit said this statement does not do justice to the large body of
federal common law that gives the FDIC rights that exceed the specific
grants of power in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and its amend-
ments.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not simply look at the statutory
text and conclude that because Congress did not expressly give this
priority to the FDIC, it does not exist. Instead, it looked to the legislative
history of the disputed provision. There, it found powerful evidence of
congressional intent to preclude such a priority.
E. What Gaff Giveth, Congress Already Hath Taken Away
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the type of priority the FDIC
requested was, at one point, included in congressional amendments to
12 U.S.C. § 1821. The congressional conference committee, however,
removed this item from the bill for several reasons. 0 First, Congress
had not carefully studied the proposal. 3 In addition, the proposal ap-
peared on its face to be fundamentally unsound as a policy matter.32
Representative Dan Glickman of Kansas, however, may have stated the
most important reason, when he said the creation of such a priority
would undermine fraud enforcement efforts.33 The priority, he said,
would be
potentially unfair to private plaintiffs who were innocent victims
of wrongdoing, and would be at cross purposes with the thrust
of the savings and loan legislation. If the FDIC was granted
an absolute priority, private parties would have little chance of
recovery and as a result would no longer bring fraud suits against
bank officers and others guilty of wrong-doing ... such a
priority would therefore have a serious adverse impact on en-
forcement efforts. Private actions, the SEC stated, are a nec-
essary supplement to the enforcement efforts of the SEC and
the Department of Justice, which do not have the resources to
enforce the law on their own.3 4
Representative Harley Staggers, Jr. of West Virginia echoed these
views." He said that if the FDIC received a priority over shareholders
29. Id. at 1541.
30. 135 Cong. Rec. 108, H 4985 (August, 1989).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 1d. at H 4989.
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and depositors, these private plaintiffs no longer would bring fraud-
based actions. He predicted this would dramatically harm enforcement
efforts and lead to more fraud. In addition, Representative Staggers
said that most conferees felt the priority was manifestly unfair. For
instance, he said, the priority rule would allow the FDIC to intervene
in a suit that private plaintiffs had been litigating for years, stay the
action, and deplete the defendant's resources.3 6 Conferees felt that such
a priority rule would not benefit the American taxpayers. Since it would
undermine efforts to curb fraud, the proposal ultimately would cost the
taxpayers more money. Finally, Representative Staggers said, conferees
observed that if investors have no recourse when bank officers obtain
investments by fraud or misrepresentation, the law would be discouraging
investment itself.
The Sixth Circuit's response in Gaff was to contend that the leg-
islative history "says nothing about why the Senate did not include this
proposal. '37 The court went on to say that the best explanation for
why Congress did not include the proposal is that Congress believed
the law of priorities in bank receiverships should be developed by the
federal courts on a case-by-case basis.
Although the statement of two legislators is not a definitive indication
of legislative intent, the Sixth Circuit's reading of the legislative history
borders on the absurd. A conference committee had the opportunity to
consider a rule directly on point with the issue in both Gaff and Jenkins.
That the conference committee chose to exclude it, and that Congress
chose to accept the committee's recommendation, speaks rather loudly
in favor of a reading that Congress thought the priority was a bad idea.
F. Other Courts Line Up Behind Jenkins
Other federal courts agree with the Jenkins analysis. In In Re Sunrise
Securities Litigation, a" the Third Circuit extended the Jenkins rule to
cover suits filed by depositors against the bank's officers and directors.
The court said that when depositors allege individual, non-derivative
claims against officers and directors, the FDIC has no priority over
their claims. Ultimately, though, the court distinguished Jenkins, holding
that the plaintiffs-depositors' cause of action was derivative and thus
subordinate to the FDIC's action.
The Fourth Circuit also has followed the Jenkins approach. In
Howard v. Haddad,3 9 the court expressly adopted the Eleventh Circuit's
36. Rep. Staggers observed: "No other Federal agency has been granted such broad
power to prejudice the rights of individuals." Id. at H 4989.
37. Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 396 (6th Cir. 1990).
38. 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990).
39. 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990).
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analysis, declaring there was no reason to recognize a priority for the
FDIC on non-derivative claims.
Howard's claims on the defendants' assets do not, however,
arise out of his status as a Bank shareholder; again, it was the
allegedly fraudulent inducements to buy the stock that form the
basis of his claims. We cannot see why the fact of liquidation
should somehow deprive Howard of these causes of action. 40
A recent federal district court decision also follows this approach.
In In Re: Atlantic Financial Federal Securities Litigation,4' the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC), an FDIC agency created to deal with the
liquidation of failed savings and loans, unsuccessfully argued for priority
over the claims of stockholders. The court cited with approval the
reasoning of Jenkins, including the Eleventh Circuit's reading of the
legislative history. More importantly, the court recognized an important
reason why the FDIC or the RTC should not have priority over share-
holders on private causes of action.
[T]he risk discussed by the RTC normally bargained for by
shareholders-that the officers or directors will mismanage the
corporation-is not the problem about which the plaintiffs in
this type of suit are complaining. Here, the plaintiffs are com-
plaining that the officers and directors fraudulently induced them
to purchase stock. This type of risk is not bargained for when
someone chooses to purchase stock, and should not be included
in the calculus of priority among creditors to a corporation. 42
The court also shot down two arguments FDIC raised as to why
Jenkins should not apply: 1) that Jenkins dealt only with the FDIC as
"insurer" and not "receiver" and 2) that the Jenkins court failed to
recognize that the RTC also represents the depositors and other creditors
of the failed bank. The court characterized both arguments as simple
misreadings of Jenkins.
On the first point, the court said the characterization of the FDIC
as "insurer" was made only in the summary of the court's holding.
Throughout the rest of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, it acknowledged
the FDIC's role as receiver and conservator. On the second point, the
court noted that the Eleventh Circuit said the FDIC claimed priority
"as a general creditor of [the bank] and assignee of any causes of
action owned by [the bank]. ' '43 Therefore, the Atlantic Financial court
40. Id. at 170.
41. 1991 U.S. Dist. No. 89-0645-Civ-A (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1991) (1991 WL 98757,
1991 LEXIS 7439). Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 96,038 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
42. No. 89-0645-Civ-A (1991 WL 98757 at 05, 1991 LEXIS at *7).
43. FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1989).
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determined that the Eleventh Circuit did recognize on whose behalf the
FDIC was operating.
As for Gaff, the district judge noted, without comment, that the
Sixth Circuit had factually distinguished Gaff from Jenkins. Without
inquiring further, the district judge said that was sufficient to make
Gaff inapplicable, since the court found the facts of Jenkins a closer
fit.
The Atlantic Financial court's decision to follow the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's reading of the legislative intent is another indication of Jenkins'
logical appeal. But the Eleventh Circuit did not dangle Jenkins by the
bare thread of legislative intent. The opinion also carried the force of
years of jurisprudence that consistently rebuffed the FDIC's attempt to
assert a priority over individual claims.
G. FDIC Priority: A Bad Idea Whose Time Never Came
The tendency of upset shareholders to go after the bank's man-
agement is not a modern phenomenon. It is not even limited to the
post-Depression FDIC era. In Chesbrough v. Woodworth," decided
almost seventy-five years ago, a group of bank shareholders successfully
maintained a cause of action against bank directors when the bank filed
false reports with the Comptroller of Currency. The trial court recognized
that not every claim brought by shareholders against a bank's officers
and directors is derivative. The court found the damages were "personal
to the plaintiff. He sues in his own right, not for the association. ' 45
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision and recognized a
private cause of action for shareholders under the National Bank Act.
In its tireless effort to keep bank shareholders out of court, the
FDIC has long tried to dismantle the distinction between private rights
and bank rights. The FDIC usually argues that shareholder claims are
more appropriately classified as derivative actions. If the FDIC wins
this battle, it has won the war against shareholders, since the FDIC,
as receiver, clearly has the sole right to bring actions on behalf of the
failed bank.
This was the precise issue in Harmsen v. Smith. 46 There, the FDIC
tried to prevent minority shareholders from maintaining a class-action
suit against directors of a failed bank. The FDIC argued that only it
had the right to assert the claims of the bank's shareholders. The FDIC
did not articulate this argument as a "priority," as it has done in later
efforts. to displace shareholder-plaintiffs. But the intended result and
rationale was the same: that the FDIC has unchallenged power to collect
44. 244 U.S. 72, 37 S. Ct. 579 (1917).
45. Id. at 77, 37 S. Ct. at 582.
46. 542 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1976).
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against a failed bank's management, and private parties are entitled to
get their chance at the management's money only after the FDIC gets
its cut.
The court ruled against the FDIC, deciding that the shareholders
were entitled to maintain individual actions in their own right. In reaching
this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit used an analysis similar to that later
used by the Eleventh Circuit in Jenkins. It simply said that since Congress
failed to give the FDIC a priority claim, the court would not second-
guess Congress' wisdom.
We realize this interpretation creates the possibility of two sets
of claims against certain directors, both of which have their
origin in activities related to affairs of an insolvent bank. Each
set, however, is distinct from the other. The recovery with respect
to one is not a recovery with respect to the other. While the
extinguishment or subordination of claims of the insolvent bank
against such directors, might be sound legislative policy, we have
discovered nothing that indicates that Congress intended this
result. 47
That same year, a federal district court ruled against a similar FDIC
attempt to gain priority over bank shareholders. In Imperial Supply Co.
v. Northern Ohio Bank,48 the court rejected the FDIC's contention that
policy considerations warranted the dismissal of the plaintiff-sharehold-
ers' federal securities suit against the bank, its officers and directors
and the bank's independent auditor.
It is possible, however, to find many cases in which a court has
stayed shareholders' claims against officers and directors until the FDIC
was able to bring its claims. But in every instance, the court so ruled
because it found the shareholders' claims to be derivative and not truly
personal to the shareholders.4 9
This critical distinction is not always easy to make. If a plaintiff-
shareholder wants to avoid losing his place in line to the FDIC, he
must be prepared to argue that his cause of action is entirely separate
from any cause of action the failed bank may have against the officers
and directors. Sometimes it can be difficult to draw a line between what
an officer or director owes the bank and what the officer or director
owes the bank's owners and investors. If the plaintiff cannot draw this
47. Id. at 501.
48. 430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1976).
49. See, e.g., FDIC V. American Bank Trust Shares, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 549 (S.C.,
Charleston Division 1978) and Palmer v. Metropolitan Bancorporation, Nos. 82-141 Civ-
T-WC and 82-565 Civ-T-WC, slip op. (M.D. Fla., 1983), dismissed 751 F.2d 392 (Ilth
Cir. 1984).
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line with some clarity, even a court that rejects the Sixth Circuit's
approach in Gaff may be unwilling to let the plaintiff proceed.
H. Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit's approach in Gaff remains an anomaly. Through
the years, many courts have considered whether an FDIC suit against'
the officers and directors of a failed bank necessarily displaces similar
actions by shareholders and depositors. The courts uniformly have said
that no such priority exists.
The weakness of the Sixth Circuit's approach can be seen in its
heavy reliance on the alleged policy of, and the amended portions of,
12 U.S.C. § 1821. The court's conclusion that Congress included no
mention of priority because it meant to leave those determinations to
the courts simply does not make sense. If Congress had failed to consider
whether the FDIC has priority over the personal actions of shareholders
and depositors, the Sixth Circuit's position might have some merit.
Congress indeed may choose to let federal courts decide certain questions
based on their common-law authority. But it is quite a different situation
for Congress to put a specific provision into a proposed statute and
then take the affirmative step of removing it before final adoption.
Such an action does not suggest that Congress meant to let courts
consider the merits of the position. It plainly suggests that Congress
rejected the proposal as a bad idea.
Another interpretive guide weighs against the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach. It is an accepted principle that when a court rules one way on
legislation, and the legislature fails to overrule the court, it can be
presumed that the legislature is satisfied with the courts' interpretation
of the law.50 In this instance, not only has Congress failed to adopt
legislation to overrule previous decisions that failed to recognize an
FDIC priority, but Congress has expressly declined to include such a
provision in subsequent legislative amendments.
The Sixth Circuit's reading of 12 U.S.C. § 1821 is understandable
in one respect. There is hardly an American today, either on the bench
or off, who is not dismayed by the staggering cost of the bailout of
failed savings and loans. As this litigation reaches the federal appeals
50. The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation
to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S.
Ct. 755, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). Thus, it is proper to
consider that Congress acts with knowledge of existing law, and without a clear mani-
festation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be har-
monious with existing law and its judicial construction. Wood v. C.I.R., 909 F.2d 1155
(8th Cir. 1990).
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courts-and as new litigation over failing commercial banks begins-
there may be a feeling that Congress intended the amended banking
laws to maximize FDIC recovery of money lost in these failures. The
title of the amendment, "Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act" (FIRREA), suggests such an intent. A skeptic might
even observe that Congress intended this result not just to stabilize the
national banking system, but to reduce the possible political fallout from
an electorate that will pay much of the bill for financial institution
failures.
However, there is nothing in the new sections to indicate that
Congress meant to give the FDIC the priority it so doggedly seeks. If
Congress felt strongly enough about maximizing FDIC recovery to the
exclusion of shareholders and depositors, there was a simple way to
express this concern: leave the priority rule in the amendment.
Since Congress chose not to do so, future courts would seem well
advised to view the Sixth Circuit's approach in Gaff as an aberration.
Congressional intent, backed up by a line of jurisprudence, indicates
that in the effort to prevent fraud and self-dealing in commercial banks,
two plaintiffs (or more) really are better than one.
Keith M. Matulich
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